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SPECIALISED M R M CREDIT INSTITUTIONS: 
A MODEL OP SUPPLY-LEADING- FINANCE 
POR FARMERS IN LOW INCOME COUNTRIES 
Why are specialised fann credit institutions founded in low 
income countries, and why do they frequently founder? This phenomenon 
of contemporary development finance and intervention may be explored 
and portrayed by a non-mathematical model incorporating basic financial 
logic and elements of the political economy of government credit to 
farmers. The model accepts technical aspects of agriculture as given. 
It succeeds in demonstrating major causal links constituting^:/the 
financial and political bases for typical patterns of institutional 
performance. 
Organisation and Operation of Specialised Farm Credit Institutions. 
Specialised farm credit institutions are defined as a class of 
financial intermediary primarily engaged in the provision of loans 
to farmers, ranchers, and others undertaking agricultural production. 
This type of intermediary is distinguishable by the specialisation of 
its loan portfolio, and also by the reflection of that specialisation 
in a narrow range of financial services offered. Specialised farm 
credit institutions do not engage on any significant scale in deposit 
taking, in the provision of money transfer services, in the safekeeping 
of valuables or in serving as fiduciaries, for example, except as 
these functions are required in the processing of loan applications 
and in loan administration. The names of specialised farm credit 
institutions vary, but •common examples include agricultural development 
bank, agricultural finance corporation, rural development bank, 
agricultural credit c orporation, land bank, and organisations with 
"agricultural" and "fund" in their titles. 
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Specialised farm credit institutions are established by-
governments in low income countries to provide financial assistance 
for agricultural production (PAO 1973j 1974, 1975). They may cater 
specifically to certain agricultural subsedtors, defined in terms of 
farm size or ci-ops, and they may be linked with various land tenure 
classifications or reforms. Their services may be directed towards 
the target groups of beneficiaries of agricultural, settlement or 
rural development projects. 
Specialised farm credit instituti&ns in low income countries 
are usually expected to provide an impetus to agricultural innovation, 
often in the small scale subsector. Such institutions may also have 
an implicit or explicit mandate to contribute to certain social 
aspects of the process of rural development. As public sector organisa-
tions in these roles, specialised farm credit institutions are sought 
out and supported by development assistance agencies, which often play 
an important role in their design, establishment and staffing, or in 
their reorganisation and rehabilitation. Although no recent global 
tallies appear to have been made, it would appear that cumulative 
combined World Bank and American aid commitments for farm credit 
schemes exceeded the equivalent of £1,500 million by 1978 (Rice, 1973a; 
World Bank 1977). The lending of other OECD donors and regional 
development banks would increase this estimate significantly. Much 
of this assistance has been directed towards specialised farm credit 
institutions rather than diversified financial institutions such as 
commercial and certain cooperative banks which also customarily provide 
significant direct and indirect financial support to the agricultural 
sector in low income countries. 
In their role as development finance agencies, specialised 
farm credit institutions are providers of supply-lending finance. 
This term, evidently coined by Patrick (1966), suggests the antithesis 
of Mrs. Robinson's observation that, "Where enterprise leads, finance 
follows"(Robinson, 1 952). Supply-lea.ding finance is a public sector 
development tactic which provides funds in advance of effective demand 
in an effort to stimulate enterprise - i.e., risk taking by borrowers -
in a socially useful manner. Supply-leading agricultural finance is 
based on the assumption that the provision of credit tied to an 
innovation, such as improved inputs or a new cash crop, will accelerate 
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the adoption of the innovation by members of the target group of 
intended borrowers. 
Specialised farm credit institutions in low income countries 
have a patchy record as financial intermediaries -(Donald, 19765 
Masini, 1977). It is perhaps to be expected that their efforts to 
achieve viability and to expand their clientele would encounter more 
complications than those of mainstream financial institutions because 
of the vagaries of agricultural production and prices, as well as the 
extent to which a certain portion of supply-leading finance and the 
activities it is designed to support have more in common with research 
and development than with commercial practice. However, the extent 
of their losses often appears to be in excess of what would be expected 
from credit institutions. Por example, Miracle (1973) estimated that 
approximately one-third of the funds were unrecoverable which had been 
loaned to farmers in the programs described in the 20-volume Spring Review 
of Small Parmer Credit, which dealt primarily with the activities of 
specialised farm credit institutions. Other observers conceited with 
the performance of these institutions and the programmes they administer 
have noted that not infrequently the levels of service they provide are 
in general rather low (Adams, 1977). In addition they often find it 
difficult to achieve loan recovery levels sufficient to permit them 
to break even financially before the allocation of administrative 
expenses (Donald, 1976), 
The Conceptual Basis for a Performance Model 
This paper attempts to explain why specialised farm credit 
institutions are formed, and why such institutions and the programmes 
they administer frequently fail to fulfil the requirements of viability 
and achieve the standards to. which they are designed. The point of view 
taken in this paper is that of the rural developer. Access is viewed 
as a key concept for ensuring that benefits of change are spread broadly 
among.target populations (Lele, 1975). Good financial performance, 
permitting 'internally generated growth, is viewed as essential to 
ensuring that access to credit is broadly based. The criterion of good 
financial performance is based on the lack of any reasonable general 
alternative: subsidisation of bad loan losses is obviously limited 
by budgetary constraints in low income countries and by other fiscal 
implications. 
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The research upon which this paper is based was conducted in 
Kenya, where the performance of financial institutions dealing with 
rural finance ranges from the notable success of the cooperative 
banking system to the distress of the Agricultural Settlement P.'und 
(Donaldson and Von Pischlce, 1973; Von Pischke, 1977). Observations 
from a number of other low income countries have reinforced the inter-
pretation developed from analysis of the political economy of the Kenyan 
situation to the point where the formulation of a general model appears 
warranted. Such a general model is applicable to the performance of 
a small credit scheme included in a larger project or portfolio as 
well as to a specialised farm credit institution as a whole. The model 
abstracts through a progression of what might be termed worst case 
assumptions. This approach is defensible on the basis of its explanatory 
power, its proximity to observed behaviour, and its methodological 
consistency. As an exercise in political economy the model identifies 
a trend in how situations involving the class of intermediary in question 
tend to develop unless checked by departures from worst case assumptions 
(Von Pischke, 1974a). 
The model proposed here incorporates two classes of influences 
\ 
on the performance of financial markets and on specialised farm credit 
institutions. The first influence is political, which stems from govern-
ment's interest in rural development, agricultural production and in 
the use of political power to benefit or to be seen to be benefitting 
various groups (PAO/CARIPLO, 1976). The second type of influence is 
financial, comprising not only the inexorable mathematics of the 
operation of financial markets but also the economic aspects of 
relationships forged in such markets. Political decisions influence 
financial market variables, while the performance of financial markets 
provides grist for the political mill. The interaction of these two 
types of influences largely determines the oft-observed lagging per-
formance of specialised farm credit institutions. 
The model begins with the assumption that the economy lacks 
a specialised farm credit institution, and that the bulk of rural 
families do not have effective access to formal sector credit. It is 
also assumed that the formal sector financial market, although not 
highly developed, is loss-avoiding, rational and worlcably competitive. 
The assumption of some degree of workable competition is warranted, as 
_ 5 - IDS/WP 341 
models of market perfection are inappropriate to financial markets 
because of the role of risk in financial intermediation and because 
of the inherent contradiction in assuming access to a single price by 
both primary sellers and ultimate buyers in situations where markets 
are made by intermediaries (Clark, 1940, 19615 Myrdal, 1968; Shaw, 
1973 5 Stigler, 1968). 
It is also assumed that the public sector perceives that the 
provision of credit for some particular agricultural purpose or for a 
certain group of cultivators would be advantageous. This perception 
is incorporated in the model as "the public sector farm credit complex," 
which consists of four related assumptions or ways of viewing the 
state of agriculture, the requisites of rural development, and the 
role of government. The first is that "farmers are poor," relative 
to other groups in society. The second is "the farm credit need creed," 
which holds that little agricultural innovation or progress along 
desired lines can occur without increased target group access to 
credit (Adams, 1971; Von Pischke, 1974b). The need creed is harmonious 
with the concern for the alleged poverty of farmers. The third is 
the axiom that government should promote rural development, while the 
fourth is that supply-leading finance can stimulate agriculture and 
i-ural development. The public sector farm credit complex defines 
the rural development problem in terms of the poverty of farmers and 
their lack of access to credit for specified purposes, observes that 
the problem is one which ought to be addressed through public sector 
intervention, and specifies a medium through which political initiative 
may be exercised. Supply-leading finance responds to the perceived 
poverty of farmers as well as to the alleged requirements that the;y mu3t 
have access to credit before an acceptable rate of material progress 
will be achieved. The provision of supply-leading agricultural credit 
is frequently linked with other measures designed to stimulate rural 
development, such as extension, but these ancilliary factors are not 
crucial to the development of the relationships explored here. 
Interaction of Interest Bates and Access 
The public sector farm credit complex produces advocacy of 
cheap farm credit. Proponents note that credit should be provided 
at a "reasonable" rate of interest for a purpose which is considered 
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a social and economic imperative, and for intended borrowers viewed 
as poor and having little alternative but to use credit if they seek 
to progress (Donald, 1976). Since informal sector interest rates, 
except on kinship and friendship loans, are high compared to those 
found in formal markets, the possibility of involving the informal 
sector in the solution to the credit problem as defined by the public 
sector farm credit complex is not seriously considered and would not 
be feasible within the low interest rate structure proposed (Bottomley, 
1962), 
The exact nominal rate proposed will depend upon local 
circumstances, but is often defined in relation to the prime or base 
lending rate applicable to loans by commercial banks to commerce and 
industry (Donald, 1976). Arguments raised against an agricultural 
interest rate structure different from those applied to industry and 
commerce often contend that it is objectionable to charge borrowers 
from disadvantaged elements in society a rate which is higher than 
that charged borrowers who use formal sector credit in the normal 
conduct of their business affairs, in many cases the result is an 
agricultural interest rate below or roughly equal to the going rates 
of interest on loans to commerce, industry and to individuals not 
dependent upon agricultural incomes who borrow fx-om commercial banks. 
The crucial point of analytical interest is that a rate structure 
applied to borrowers already having access to formal sector credit is 
not significantly different from that proposed for a loan portfolio 
intended to encompass potential box^rowers currently beyond the margin 
of formal sector finance (McKinnon, 1973). 
Low formal sector interest rates on the types of loans most 
useful to rural people tend paradoxically to x-estrict their access to 
formal sector financial services (Adams, 1971; Adams, Davis and 
Bettis, 1972; Gonzalez-Vega, 1976; Von Pischke, 1977). The mechanism 
of access limitation is most easily demonstrated through the impact 
of lending rates applied by the intermediaries comprising the formal 
financial sector prior to the establishment of a specialised farm 
credit institution. Low rates tend to place the intermediary in a 
disadvantageous position relative to his concerns for loss avoidance 
(McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). The basis for this position is seen 
in the operating or administrative costs of providing rural financial 
services of the usual formal sector type, as well as in the degree of 
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risk aversion constrained by low returns on loans outstanding. (The 
effect of interest rates on competition for deposits, and hence on 
access to deposit services by rural people, is problematic and is 
not dealt with here.) 
Rural customers, especially target group members having low 
levels of financial activity, are a costly market to serve (Adams, 
1971). They tend to deal in small transactions, which are relatively 
costly fox- a formal sector intermediary to process. They frequently 
are scattered geographically, .making loan administration difficult. 
These two factors preclude economies of scale in intermediation because 
of the small size of the market around a rural office. Rural people 
may not be accustomed to modern commercial practice and hence not be 
so concerned about loan due dates as other customers would be who are 
more conditioned to the conventions of modern finance and more dependent 
on continued access to it, which raises the lender's costs of loan and 
liquidity portfolio management. The propensity for small actors on the 
financial stage to conduct their business in cash,rather than by some 
form of payment order, requires that intermediaries in rural areas 
maintain relatively higher levels of liquidity, usually in the form of 
cash on hand, than similar operations in urban areas. Cash balances 
earn no interest for the lender. The necessity of maintaining 
relatively high levels of cash relative to deposits in or$er to meet 
the demands made by deposit holders adds to the cost of servicing 
these clients. 
The primarily agricultural economy in which rural people are 
engaged may be more subject to seasonal and cyclical variability than 
many other types of economic activity. The marketed or income-producing 
portion of agricultural produce is subject to even greater variability 
as a residual after relatively constant subsistence requirements are 
satisfied (Allan, 1967). Variability in income tends to reduce the 
formal sector lender's evaluation of the debt capacity of the target 
group (Von Pischke, 1976). The prudent lender in effect bases his 
calculation of prospective borrower debt capcity only on that portion 
of expected future income which would be available for loan repayment 
in situations of reasonably expected adversity. In effect, the lender 
looks for the ocean below the waves, which makes him extremely selective 
in storm-prone shallow waters. His rationale rests on the desire to 
assure a steady or highly certain stream of loan repayments and interest 
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inoome, which is consistent with the lender's objective of maintaining 
sufficient liquidity to meet on a timely bsis the demands of depositors 
and other creditors. Variability may make it difficult for the lender 
to plan his future course with a degree of accuracy consistent with 
considerations of loss avoidance and solvency. Variability of returns 
is more appropriate to equity or risk capital than to debt capital. 
Variability in return is viewed by the lender as a credit risk. 
One determinant of his willingness to tear this risk is the interest 
and other income which is likely to be realised from the class of 
transaction concerned. Unprofitable types of business, defined to 
include those involving substantial degrees of uncertainty from the 
perspective of the intermediary, tend to be avoided. When interest 
rates (used here as a generic heading referring to all financial 
charges levied by lenders) are repressed in the sense . of being kept 
low, intermediaries are i-estricted to low margins. They are not 
encouraged to expand their markets into activities involving higher 
costs, which typically include the costs of greater uncertainty. 
Low rates keep the margin between those who are served and those who 
are not served closer to the area of "prime" customers whose relation-
ships are most highly valued by lenders. Lenders stringently ration 
credit according to commercial criteria of creditworthiness in low 
interest rate regimes, ceteris paribus. 
The situation which evolves from low interest rate regimen, 
both in terras of low levels of access and in terms of low levels 
of liquidity, is aptly summarised by McKinnon (1973): 
Organized banking has a sorry record in penetrating the 
economic hinterland or less developed countries, in serving 
rural areas in general, and in .serving small borrowers in 
particular. Bank credit remains a financial appendage of certain 
enclaves: exclusively licensed import activities, specialized 
large-scale mineral exports, highly protected manufacturing, 
large international corporations and various government agencies, 
such as coffee marketing boards or publicly controlled utilities. 
Even ordinary government deficits on current account frequently 
preempt the limited lending resources of the deposit banks. 
Financing of the rest of the economy must be met from the 
meager resources of moneylenders, pawnbrokers, and cooperatives. 
The failure of banks to earn high equilibrium PQ, "COS of return 
from their priviledged borrowers is reflected back in an 
unduly low return to depositors - one that may well be negative 
in real terms if inflation is at all significant. Scarce 
capital is underpriced by the banks although not by the money-
lenders. It is hardly surprising that savers respond to low 
real returns by reducing their holdings of money and near-
monies far below what might be considered socially optimal; and, 
of course, outstanding bank credit is reduced commensurately. 
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The Specialised Parm Credit Institution as a Response 
to Credit Rationing by Commercial Criteria 
Stringent credit rationing by commercial criteria restricts 
rural access to financial services, as suggested by a relative paucity 
of rural offices of banks and other formal sector financial intermediaries. 
It is usually also reflected in service rationing devices which exclude 
large numbers of rural people. Loan security requirements may be beyond 
the capacity of most rural households. Minimum balance requirements 
applied to deposit accounts and minimum transactions sizes may be high 
in relation to the sizes of transactions and incomes normal for rural 
areas. 
Restricted access to formal financial services provides grounds 
for remedial intervention, in the form of establishment of a specialised 
farm credit institution, under the public sector farm credit complex 
(Reserve Bank of India, 1954)° The formation of a specialised farm 
credit institution is deemed appropriate because it meets a perceived 
need for a deserving group in a socially desirable or politically 
expedient way (Tardy, 1938). The perceived need is credit at low rates 
of interest, including credit to support agricultural innovation. Such 
an institution is intended to overcome weaknesses in market performance, 
and is therefore usually not designed to be dependent upon market 
resources (World Bank, 1975). It is funded through the national treasury 
as a public sector entity, frequently with support from external non-
marlcet sources such as aid agencies. (That specialised farm credit 
institutions are good foreign exchange earners, often opening new 
avenues of access to soft foreign loans through donors' preferences 
for dealing with such institutions, may also help to explain their 
popularity in low income countries.) 
By definition, a specialised farm credit institution is quite 
selective in the mix of financial services it provides, operating on 
one side of the rural financial market only. Credit access is considered 
the primary problem according to the public sector farm credit complex, 
and deposit taking and money transfer services are typically not developed. 
Rural savings capacities and liquid resources are usually thought to be 
small (CARIPLO, 1971). Institutions already in place, such as post 
office savings banks or rural branches of commercial banks and cooperatives, 
may be thought to be providing adequate financial services outside the 
credit sphere. Policymakers may not perceive any advantages in replicating 
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facilities or stimulating competition for rural deposits or money-
transfer services. In addition, the managerial and accounting demands 
of operating deposit services and money transfer systems are much 
greater than those of a lending agency, and there are obviously merits 
of opting for simplicity initially. 
Effects of One-Sided Intervention in Rural Finance 
One-sided intervention in rural financial markets has several 
consequences which are frequently overlooked. It tends to fragment 
these .markets further. It provides credit unrelated to savings channels, 
ana makes little direct contribution to stimulating rural savings. 
Such intervention may translate the public sector farm credit complex 
into a popular belief that formal sector credit is essential, or at 
least the most feasible means of securing material advance (Lele, 1973; 
Schatz, 1 965; Vasthoff, 1968).; at the expense of the tradition of self-
help and self-finance and of the continued strength or .heightened 
development of informal financial mechanisms such as rotating savings 
and credit associations. 
But, most importantly, one-sided intervention limits the access 
of a specialised farm credit institution to market funds and information. 
This limitation is implicit in dependence upon the national treasury 
and external donors. Lack of such access results in alienation of the 
specialised farm credit institution. Alienation stems from the inability 
to act as a rural financial intermediary, rather than merely as a link 
between the government or fat side of the dual economy and the rural 
or lean side. Rural people are not perceived as a constituency or 
market to be developed, but rather as poor, exploited or economically 
incompetent elements requiring assistance (iCratoska, 1975). Rural 
people, in turn, do not view the specialised farm credit institution 
as something of their own, but as an intrusion. In these circumstances 
a specialised farm credit institution does not have access to inform-
ation about rural financial flows, behaviour and priorities which is 
available only to those who operate on both sides of rural financial 
markets. Denied such information and insight, the specialised farm 
credit institution's decision making expertise is limited because 
its managers are divorced from the context required to view finance 
broadly or creatively (Von Pischke, 1974a). They are not in a position 
to be stimulated by the discipline imposed and opportunities offered 
by market forces. 
_ 11 - IDS/WP 341 
Lacking essential information and also limited by budgetary 
and operating constraints imposed by Government sponsors, specialised 
farm credit institutions generally are forced to ration credit stringently. 
This stringency is different from that based on commercial criteria 
applied by other formal sector intermediaries, because it is based on 
considerations which are fundamentally political, reflecting the genesis 
of specialised farm credit institutions. Political criteria, broadly 
defined, are inherent in farm credit programme design, in the allocation 
mechanism employed by national governments and by development assistance 
agencies seeking to promote the welfare of certain target groups 
selected on the basis of extra-market considerations. 
Credit Rationing by Specialised Parm Credit Institutions 
Credit rationing by farm credit institutions tends to take 
two forms which depart from a financial optimum at which the borrower's 
level of indebtedness achieves a privately desirable harmony between 
repayment capcity, debt service obligations and the stimulation of 
enterprise. These departures reflect the innovative and political 
dimensions of the assumptions comprising the public sector farm credit 
complex and of the developments determined by the policies and actions 
inspired by the complex as outlined above. The two types of credit 
rationing commonly employed by specialised farm credit institutions 
may be termed intensive and extensive. These deviations from traditional 
financial practice reflect the political-cum-development orientation 
of the public sector farm credit complex, and may be termed credit 
rationing according to political criteria. 
Intensive credit rationing involves identification of a 
specific target group, and the provision to members of that group 
of amounts of credit which are large in relation to the existing scope 
of their operations. For example, a farmer with two local cows may 
be given a loan to buy two specimens of an exotic breed. A small 
farmer planting local maize and using' organic fertilizer may be issued 
a loan, possibly in kind, to enable her to plant her entire maize 
plot with a high yielding variety nourished by chemical fertilizer. 
A farmer using bullocks for draught power may be accorded credit for 
the purchase of a tractor. 
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Intensive credit rationing has technological and innovative 
features which make it a very attractive approach from the perspective 
of aid agencies, and it is often found in the externally funded 
activities of specialised farm credit institutions. The usual objective 
of intensive credit rationing is to increase agricultural production and 
the incomes of borrowers through innovation employing a more complex 
technology. Because the size of the loan is such that borrowers 
could not reasonably be expected to repay in full and on time out of 
their pre-loan cash flow, loan repayment must come from the additional 
cash flow to be created by the loan-supported investment. Credit 
allocation under these circumstances tends to be quite selective. 
Elaborate access mechanisms using farm plans or budgets are frequently 
employed by lenders in the allocation process (Adams and Nehman, 1977). 
An assumption underlying intensive credit rationing is that lack of 
access to finance is a binding-constraint to the' realisation of increased 
production and augmented farmer incomes through innovation, economies 
of scale, or other avenues. This in turn implies that all other 
elements essential to the realisation of the objectives of the programme, 
including the ability to accommodate the risks involved, are in> place 
and can be rendered operative by finance. Intensively rationed 
credit is supply-leading finance par excellence. 
Extensive credit rationing is motivated by considerations 
of access as well as of production. Credit is rationed extensively 
to large numbers of farmers in broadly defined target groups. For 
example, all members in good standing of a cooperative may have access 
to seed and fertilizer loans, "All commercial growers of wheat having 
title to more than ten hectares of "land may be eligible for production 
loans. Within the budget or balance sheet constraints of specialised 
farm credit institutions, broad access implies relatively small loans 
to numerous borrowers. Loan limits under extensive rationing are 
frequently specified in terms of rules of thumb or standard factors 
as loan limits per hectare of credit-supported enterprises, and the 
access mechanism is relatively simple. Extensive credit rationing is 
most frequently found in s GS, sonal input credit programmes. These are 
consistent with the small amounts which are available to each borrov/er, 
the production-oriented bias of the lenders, and the broad appeal 
essential to the political justification of the activity. Credit 
schemes using extensive rationing techniques are usually funded 
directly by governments in low income countries, without the support 
of donors. Exceptions are found in donor-supported area development 
projects and certain aid schemes for cooperatives. 
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Each variety of stringent credit rationing to political 
criteria contains the seeds of its ov/n financial destruction. These 
seeds germinate and take root to the extent that political or welfare 
motivations overwhelm financial considerations. Programmes with 
extremely intensive or extensive rationing self-destruct more rapidly 
than schemes with moderate doses, assuming other things equal. 
Intensive credit rationing tends to attempt to use credit to 
perform the function of equity capital. That function is to absorb 
the impact of uncertainty. In financial terms, the return to equity 
or ownership capital reflects a variable, residual aiariin. after permit-
ting a steady flow of resources back to the lender according to the 
agreed loan terms. Intensively rationed loans, large relative to 
the financial status of the borrower, are intended to change the borrower? 
onfarrn factor mix significantly. Intensive credit rationing contains 
the inherent danger of permitting the borrower's finances to outrun 
his managerial and risk-bearing capabilities, especially during the 
critical initial period of adaptation to credit-supported change. 
When this occurs, the borrower may not be able to generate sufficient 
cash flow from his new activity to repay the loan which permitted 
him to undertake it. By indebting borrowers deeply, intensive credit 
rationing tends to impose relatively large debt service burdens. In 
times of reasonably expected adversity - which are common both to 
agriculture and to the implementation of new technologies - borrowers 
find it difficult to carry such burdens (Von Pischko, 1976). Delin-
quency in repayment easily results. Borrowers may not regard trans-
gression of loan contracts very seriously; they are willing to accept 
the, tenets of the public sector farm credit complex, and they view 
the lender as an alien institution with access to the tremendous 
resources of the government. 
Extensive credit rationing also tends to lead to financial 
default. Casting their nets widely, lenders using the extensive approach 
provide credit to some borrowers who are not in a position to use it 
prudently, or who have little intention of repaying, or who are so 
exposed to uncertainty or who are so close to the margin of subsistence 
that even small repayment obligations assume major proportinns. In 
these cases, accumulation of arrears on the lender's books is probable. 
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Even for those full3r willing to repay who borrowed in the expectation 
that their incomes would be increased, the small sums of credit 
extended under extensive credit rationing may involve certain 
difficulties. The prescribed husbandry practices which lenders often 
intend to support may involve indivisibilities in technical linkages. 
Improved seeds without fertilizers, for example, may not perform 
significantly better than traditional varieties. Even if all inputs 
are provided in kind, the new adopter may not use them in the prescribed 
proportions for reasons of risk aversion. If loans are disbursed in 
cash, the amount provided to each borrower may be small relative to 
the financial requirements of improved inputs packages, leading to 
their incomplete adoption. The farmer using only a portion of an 
innovation may fail to achieve the yields which the complete package 
could deliver, enhanced levels of production fail to materialise, 
and the borrower has insufficient incremental cash flow for loan 
repayment. Access to extensively rationed credit does not necessarily 
stimulate the pace of adoption of superior production techniques. 
On the other hand extensively rationed loans may be so 
trifling as not to engender any commitment to their productive use 
by the borrower. Small sums may more conveniently be used for 
consumption purposes,perhaps for luxury items or entertainment. If 
the recipient does not take credit use very seriously, it is unlikely 
that credit repayment would be accorded a very high priority. Default 
occurs. 
Credit rationing by political criteria easily leads to poor 
loan discipline, defined to include delinquency, deceit and diversion. 
All of these constitute default according to the technical use of the 
word in finance to indicate any breach of a loan contract. Delinquency 
denotes the failure to repay according to schedule, and reasons of 
inability and of unwillingness have been discussed under the headings 
of intensive and extensive . credit rationing. Deceit arises because 
borrowers have an incentive to circumvent the rules of the game, 
especially when the rules are made by a lender which is alien to them 
and which is thought to have access to hugh amounts of public sector 
resources which it is prepared to ration according to political criteria. 
One means of circumventing the loan limits per hectare often imposed 
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under extensive credit rationing is to apply for credit for a larger 
parcel than will be cultivated. Another means .is to.borrow under a 
different name eacfe year, keeping ahead of lenders' efforts to enforce 
repayment terms. If loan repayments are duducted at source from 
crop delivery proceeds, there is an incentive to attempt to deliver 
under a different name front that in which borrowing was undertaken, 
or to use family members, friends and others as delivery agents. This 
tactic is often successful when the lender's record keeping system is 
not finely tuned. The relatively large sums disbursed under intensively 
rationed loans may tempt the borrower to divert a portion of the proceeds, 
especially if he is not entirely comfortable with the quant-um leap in 
risk and managerial demands which loan use may involve. loan-
supported purchases or receipts in kind may be resold for immediate 
cash, or fictitious invoices may be submitted with the connivance 
of accommodating suppliers of loan-financed goods. Diversion is 
probably even more common under extensive rationing, especially when 
loans are disbursed in cash. 
While possibilities of thee® types of abuse are found where-
ver credit exists, increasingly stringent rationing of credit under 
what may be called political criteria increase borrower incentive 
to engage in abuse, because the borrower's repayment capacities are 
over-burdened ox- because borrower rationality and financial respons-
ibility are not positioned to coincide under the terms on which 
credit is extended. 
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Repercussion of Poor Loan Discipline 
Poor loan discipline poses several problems for those implementing 
credit programmes through specialised farm credit institutions. The poor 
collection performance which it entails tends to impair the development of 
the intermediary concerned. In financial terms, funds which would become 
available for releriding as outstanding loans mature are locked up as arrears. 
Potential new borrowers find their access to loans delayed or denied because 
of the declining liquidity of the lender. In order to maintain broad access 
to extensively rationed credit, the lender is forced to reduce the amount of 
the average loan because the amount of loanable funds declines with each lending 
cycle as arrears accumulate. At the same time the borrower finds that the 
effects of inflation increase the coats of modern husbandry. The forces which 
cause the accumulation of arreas in portfolios of extensively rationed credit 
are strengthened as borrowers find the amounts available increasingly trivial. 
As portfolios slide increasingly into arrears, whether the credit the intensively 
or extensively rationed, the revolving fund of resources fails to complete 
the full circle, which may eventually lead to decapitalisation of the lender. 
In managerial terms, attention to overdues has an opportunity cost to 
the specialised farm credit institution. Day-to-day collection problems 
consume the scarce managerial resources of the intermediary, often at the expense 
of activities requiring a longer time horizon, such as planning, staff training, 
and designing more effective services for rural people. In addition, the 
accumulation of arrears and associated poor financial performance communicates 
to staff having a financial or accounting outlook that their energies are not 
yielding satisfactory results, which is easily demoralising. If no staff 
have such outlooks, or if those who do are rendered ineffective or leave 
because of the working environment created by growing arrears, it is unlikely 
that the institution could become an efficient intermediary. 
As.damaging as these effects are within the specialised farm credit 
institution,.they may be dwarfed by external repercussions. Steps toward 
effective access to rural financial services provided by formal sector inter-
mediaries other than specialised farm credit institutions may be retarded by 
the poor record of the specialised farm credit institution. The tradition 
of poor loan discipline started under government schemes may be dismantled only 
at a cost, and profit — 'formal sector intermediaries may be deterred 
from serving the rural poor because of that cost. They may be increasingly 
reluctant to extend credit in innovative ways to rural target groups because 
of the heightened political sensitivity of enforcing rural loan contracts 
engendered by levels of performance achieved by specialised farm credit institutii 
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Achievement of certain rural development targets may also be more difficult 
because of poor loan discipline. The defaulters themselves, originally considered 
as poor people deserving of financial assistance, are placed in an adversary 
position against their former financial partner in development,. The flow of com-
munication between borrower and lender is constricted, A basis: for distrust is 
created between rural people on the one hand and rural development administrators, 
extension agents and staff of the public sector lending institution on the other,, -
Distrust raises the costs of rural development administration and initiatives 
taken by the government by making consensus more difficult to achieve, or by 
requiring the exercise of greater force by authorities for the successful implemen-
tation of programmes involving rural participation. 
Widespread default also demonstrates to rural people that government is 
not able or not willing to enforce contracts, in this case the lean document, to 
which it (or an official institution) is a party. Cases taken to court by specia-
lised farm credit instiution may strain the ability of courts to dispense or to 
be seen as dispensing justice, especially if defaulters are numerous (Lele, 1975)„ 
Litigation of this type may also impair the ability of the courts to deal nromtly 
with routine cases, such as boundary disputes, cattle theft and inheritance, because 
the queue of litigants is increased. The legal force of formal sector contracts 
may be compromised by the types of situations which arise out of default on specialised 
farm credit institution loans. Deterioration in contract enforceability retards 
commercial advance and the contribution which commerce and commercial practice 
make, to rural development. 
The accumulation of arrears also subjects the specialised farm credit insti-
tution to increased political pressure and intervention. Those who formed the 
specialised farm credit institution to assist the rural poor are not likely to 
be enthusiastic about seeing their creation turn into an expropriator of rural 
property or the architect of a black list of defaulters to be denied further access 
to credit, Fblitical interference in collection activities may be exercised across 
the board, permitting all defaulters to take a longer free ride, or it may be 
selective in favour of certain groups or individuals. Pressure may be applied 
whether the specialised farm credit institution must look to the courts for redress, 
or whether under its charter it is permitted extra-legal administrative recourse 
as an official corporation,, This power, often accorded, heightens the possibility 
of arbitrary action by government agents against the rural poor or specific seg-
ments of the rural poor. 
In addition to the possibility of creating costly tension between rural 
people and the government"s administrative activities, widespread default may also 
be a divisive factor among rural people. The selective nature of credit access 
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may be magnified by default and by selective efforts to enforce loan discipline. 
Those borrowers who succeed most well in defaulting may incur the animosity or 
envy, depending upon the case, of those who are caught or who are timid in their 
default. To the extent that the structure of default mirrors the rural power 
structure, considerations of equity are violated by collection activities which 
are subject to some degree of control or manipulation by the power structure. 
Thus, the initial concern for access, expressed through an inappropriate channel, 
ends by violating the parallel concern for equity (Blair, 1973). 
As the development of this model suggests, the public sector farm credit 
complex does not contain the basis for the correction of the many unfortunate 
direct and indirect effects that it so easily engenders. In addition, the tradi-
tions of poor loan discipline which it may spawn tend to be self-perpetuating (Rice, 
1973b) In this respect credit programmes are probably less tractable than most non-
financial activities undertaken by the public sector in an effort to assist rural 
people. Credit programmes are less tractable because they leave a track — arrears 
remain on the books for a very long time, debilitating the specialised farm credit be 
institution. It may/argued, but not within the scope of this paper, that the 
lagging performance of a specialised farm credit institution requires much more 
time and effort to correct than would be required with respect to faltering or 
ineffective performance of an extension service or input supply or produce market-
ing system. Such activities have a shorter turnover cycle than credit schemes 
burdened by arrears, and are administratively more flexible because of the prima-
rily current nature of the bulk of their activities. It may also be argued that 
the costs of lagging performance of a farm credit system are higher, from almost that 
any perspective other than/of political expediency, than those associated 
with the poor performance of many other types of activities within the usual 
ambit of public sector initiatives in rural development 
The Utility of the Model and of Lagrjinr^ _.Perfqrmance 
The model outlined here describes, in worst case terms, the problems which 
to some degree affect most specialised farm credit institutions iri low income 
countries. Where the model stated in worst case terms appears superficially not 
to apply or not to offer a valid analytical approach, several exogenous factors may 
be at work. However, the exogenous factors of greatest importance vindicate the 
analytical framework provided by the model. (The model is similar to the.cobweb 
theorem in that it can show cycles of contraction as well as of expansion, depen-
ding upon the assumptionsused.) 
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The most positive vindication of the model in cases in which it appears not 
to apply is found in situations in which policy or institutional design departs 
from the assumptions of the public sector farm credit complex. For example, the 
rural poor may be viewed as a largely untapped, potential market for formal 
sector financial services, and initiatives to tap it may proceed along lines 
reasonably consistent with considerations of cost effectiveness. Likewise, low 
interest rate policies may be abandoned in moves towards financial liberalisation 
in efforts to enhance the quality as well as the quantity of the financial sector's 
contribution to economic development. In these cases reality may unfold in a 
manner consistent with but opposite to the model, in a positive or best case way 
which permits the development of independent, strong intermediaries and greatly 
expanded access to financial services by rural people (\/on Pischke, 197?). 
The model may also superficially appear not to apply when government or 
donors provide so much assistance to the intermediary that it is able to.become 
larger and serve more people in spite of itself. Arrears may accumulate, but they 
many not impede new lending so long as outside funds are pouring in as subsidies, 
debt and equity capital. When portfolios expand rapidly the proportion in arrears 
may remain relatively small or stable because of the mathematics involved; although 
a slackening of the rate of addition to the portfolio would mean that an increasing 
portion of the portfolio would slip into arrears. In these cases of poor lender 
performance overwhelmed by access to new funds, the model is still useful. It 
indicates those policies and activities which require influxes of funds in order 
to keep the lender liquid, and provides a systematic basis for identifying the 
types of costs which reflect these policies and activities. 
But why would new funds continue to be provided? To return to worst case 
assumptions, poor financial performance by a specialised farm credit institution 
need not put it at any real disadvantage in relation to its sponsors. Its poor 
loan recovery record may very well reinforce the public sector farm credit complex: 
not only are rural people poor, but they are too poor to repay their loans. Poor 
performance may.actually increase the intermediary's ability to raise more funds 
from government, and especially from donors. Assistance agencies are often eager 
to shore up the operations of their client farm credit institutions so that pro-
gramme continuity is maintained and country relationships solidified, and so that 
more farmers may be helped, Past losses or failures may be viewed as sunk deve-
lopment costs which offer a basis for greatly improved performance at some future 
time. The strategy of "more of the same, only better," can lead to a situation of 
"good money after bad." 
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At some point rehabilitation and reorganization of the specialised farm 
credit institution may be necessary, but this admission on the part of a government 
provides the possibility for increased donor leverage, which of course is 
accompanied by large amounts of new money. Skilful governments may attempt to. 
create competition among donors to offset donor demands for increased controls, 
tighter performance commitments or higher interest rates. In any event, funds 
are usually forthcoming' because of the strength and convenience of the orthodoxy 
of rural financial market intervention contained in the public sector farm credit 
complex. More funds enable more farmers to receive loans. 
Donors or governments may also use lagging farm credit institution perfor-
mance to raise the institutional stakes of rural development assistance. The 
cause of poor performance can be attributed to any number of shortcomings and 
conditions which are wothy of remedial intervention. Agricultural extension and 
farmer education are frequently invoked pallitives which are virtually unassailable 
within conventional approaches to rural development planning. Among the most 
attractive remedial proposals for donors are those which permit the launching of 
ventures considered as innovative or experimental. Crop insurance is one of these. 
It can contribute to the maintenance of liquidity by a specialised farm credit 
institution if it permits the automatic.cancellation of loans outstanding in cases 
of distress arising from insured causes. At the same time, it provides protection from 
to the borrower by insulating him/risk. On these grounds, crop insurance 
for poor farmers has the air of a panacea. It can bail out foundering credit, 
schemes, address directly the uncertain production conditions of poor farmers, 
and provide a means of resource transfer wnich can probably operate at a financial 
loss with more impunity than a credit institution. 
However, the probability of developing a self-sustaining and efficient crop 
insurance scheme serving large numbers of members of rural target groups would 
,of 
not appear to be/a greatly different order than the probability of creating a 
specialised farm credit intermediary successful under the same criteria. Is it 
reasonable to assume that one public sector financial institution founded for 
largely welfare reasons would be more successful than another? What special 
factors would enable an insurance scheme to be managed more efficiently, to be less 
vulnerable to political intervention and to be more dynamic than a credit scheme? 
If the causes which are insured are in fact responsible for the poor performance of 
specialised farm credit institutions, how would their operation or impact be 
essentially altered? 
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The Future _of_..the, Ptiblic JBector Farm^  J3rj3di_t_.Comj^ ex, 
Given the problems which plague specialised farm credit institutions in the 
public sector, what is their future course? One certainty is that they will con-
tinue to receive large amounts of funds from their sponsor governments and from 
donors. What is less certain is the survival of the public sector farm credit 
complex. In certain countries the complex will be overwhelmed by measures which 
go far beyond mere intervention in rural financial markets. Tightly centralised 
control of agricultural production and of the lives of rural people, and the 
reduction of. the role of the formal financial sector to that of a set of accounts 
for the planning authority could massively outflank the concerns raised in the model 
developed here. In other countries the public sector farm credit complex will be 
isolated by trends in rural financial market research. New directions have been 
apparent in the literature for some time. The assumptions are increasingly chal-
lenged that rural people are.unable to save and that the informal market, beyond 
kinship and friendship loans, is characterised by high monopoly rents derived from 
"usurious" rates of interest. In these countries the institutional variable of 
greatest interest may be the length of the lag between the realisation that 
present systems are based on inappropriate assumptions and the development of 
new responses by those responsible for the design of public sector interventions. 
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